By JT Santana | jtwb768
There is something peculiarly American about declaring undying devotion to the Constitution and then becoming furious when somebody uses it. Religious liberty receives enthusiastic applause right up to the moment a Muslim exercises it in public. Suddenly, people who demand strict obedience to the founding document start looking for an invisible footnote requiring congressional candidates to pass a Bible inspection.
The latest occasion for this constitutional indigestion concerns Abdul El-Sayed, Michigan’s newly elected U.S. senator, and viral graphics speculating that Vice President JD Vance will be forced to swear him in on Thomas Jefferson’s Quran. In a November 12 interview with NPR’s Leila Fadel, El-Sayed said he expected to use a Quran but had not settled on the particular copy. Jefferson’s was one possibility; a historic Quran at the University of Michigan was another. A possibility is not a confirmed arrangement, regardless of how confidently a meme positions its capital letters (Fadel, 2026).
That factual distinction deserves attention. The larger constitutional point deserves considerably more: a United States senator takes an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America. The senator does not pledge governmental allegiance to the book used during the ceremony. A religious text may give the promise personal significance. It does not become the nation’s operating manual through contact with somebody’s palm.
The Quran does not acquire a Senate seat. A family Bible does not receive committee assignments. No leather-bound volume gets to introduce legislation, question a judicial nominee, or explain why an infrastructure project somehow became an argument about somebody’s bathroom.
The public obligation belongs to the person taking the oath. Its object is the Constitution. Confusing the ceremonial book with the constitutional commitment is a serious error dressed up as patriotic vigilance.
None of this requires liking El-Sayed, supporting his party, or agreeing with his positions. Criticize his proposals, examine his statements, challenge his judgment, and demand results. Those are normal responsibilities in a representative government. Treating his religion as evidence that he cannot make the same constitutional promise as everyone else is a different enterprise.
And if the argument is that America’s founding framework requires him to use a Christian Bible, the immediate problem is painfully simple. Somebody has brought a very strong opinion to a reading assignment they did not complete.
The Constitution Did Not Establish a Congressional Book Club
Article VI places the constitutional oath requirement and the prohibition on religious tests together. Federal and state officials covered by its language must commit to supporting the Constitution, and religious tests cannot serve as qualifications for federal office. The document accommodates an oath or an affirmation, rather than demanding one prescribed religious expression (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3).
That arrangement answers the central question before anyone gets to the ceremonial furniture. The government needs an enforceable public commitment to constitutional duties. It does not need a denominational membership card, a pastor’s recommendation, or proof that the candidate’s grandmother owned the correct translation.
The Senate’s published oath makes the commitment explicit. Its central promise is to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” The remaining provisions address allegiance, freely accepting the obligation, and faithfully performing the office. They do not make the participant’s chosen religious text a source of federal legislative authority (U.S. Senate, n.d.-a).
Read that distinction carefully. An official can regard a religious book as sacred and still accept that public duties operate under constitutional law. Millions of ordinary interactions already depend on people separating personal convictions from obligations they share with others. A public oath makes the obligation explicit; it does not erase the person’s conscience.
For a Christian, a Bible may make a promise feel especially solemn. For a Muslim, a Quran may serve that function. Someone without religious beliefs can make a serious affirmation without pretending to possess a faith for the benefit of the cameras. The sincerity of the commitment cannot reasonably be measured by whether the person selected a book familiar to the loudest spectator.
Demanding that a Muslim use a Bible would create a particularly strange test of honesty. The person would be asked to demonstrate trustworthiness by participating in a religious presentation selected to satisfy somebody else. That would reward conformity in appearance, which is a poor substitute for integrity in conduct.
It would be equally absurd to demand that a Christian abandon a family Bible merely to prove independence from religion. Religious freedom includes the opportunity to express a belief voluntarily. The constitutional boundary concerns what government may require and what public officials must uphold.
The practical standard is refreshingly ordinary: take the required oath or affirmation, accept its obligations, and perform the job within constitutional limits. Nobody needs to convene a special committee on acceptable bindings. Congress has enough difficulty completing its existing assignments without adding theological quality control.
Jefferson’s Quran Is Real; the Imaginary Permission Slip Is Not
The historical detail behind the meme is authentic. Thomas Jefferson owned a two-volume English translation of the Quran, printed in London in 1764, which later entered the Library of Congress through the purchase of his collection in 1815. In January 2007, the Library announced that Representative-elect Keith Ellison would use those volumes for his individual ceremonial oath (Library of Congress, 2007).
There is undeniable comic satisfaction in that history. Someone announces that a Quran has no place in American public life, and the national library can respond by producing one from Thomas Jefferson’s bookshelf. The rebuttal arrives with archival documentation and substantially better provenance than a Facebook comment.
Still, history deserves more respect than being reduced to a convenient punch line. Owning a religious text does not establish that its owner practiced that religion or endorsed every passage. A library records interests, inquiries, purchases, gifts, and intellectual pursuits. It is not a stack of sworn declarations agreeing with every author.
Anyone who has researched a subject knows the difference. A writer can own books about political movements they reject, religions they do not practice, and governments they would never wish to live under. Reading is not recruitment. A bookshelf is not a collection of loyalty oaths.
A Muslim senator does not need a founding-era celebrity to have owned a Quran before using one. The right cannot depend on whether an archivist can locate a suitably prestigious former owner.
Jefferson’s ownership is relevant as historical context, but it is unnecessary as constitutional permission. That point gets lost when supporters make the entire defense rest on Jefferson. It can accidentally concede that a minority religion needs validation from a famous member of the majority before receiving equal treatment. The more durable argument rests on the governing rule: public office is not conditioned on adopting the majority’s faith.
A Quran purchased last week would not create a different constitutional obligation from Jefferson’s historic copy. A Bible passed through six generations would not make its user more legally accountable than a Bible purchased yesterday. Sentimental and historical significance can vary enormously; the public duty remains the same.
The Library of Congress’s account of Ellison’s ceremony supplies another useful detail. His individual ceremony followed the official oath taken with other House members on the chamber floor. The famous photograph captured an important personal and public moment, but the photograph was not the entire legal event (Fineberg, 2007).
That distinction should temper the certainty of anyone diagnosing constitutional collapse from a cropped image. A photograph can reveal what someone held, wore, or wanted to commemorate. It cannot, by itself, explain every procedural step that made the person a member of Congress.
America Has Survived Other Reading Selections
The claim that a Christian Bible is indispensable encounters an inconvenient obstacle: the historical record. American oath ceremonies have included religious texts, legal volumes, and no Bible at all. The country has managed to continue functioning without establishing a federal department responsible for checking everyone’s page markers.
John Quincy Adams provides an early example, and his own diary offers a more precise account than the usual social-media shorthand. Describing his March 4, 1825, inauguration, Adams recorded that he pronounced the presidential oath from a volume of laws held by Chief Justice John Marshall. The diary identifies the constitutional promise he made; it does not describe a requirement that a Bible supply its legitimacy (Adams, 1825). That episode alone dismantles the claim that American government has always required a single religious text.
Theodore Roosevelt offers an even less cluttered example. The Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies records that no Bible was used when he took the presidential oath in Buffalo in September 1901. Its entry under “Bible Used” is a concise “None” (Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, n.d.).
That is an admirably efficient answer to a surprisingly persistent misunderstanding. No emergency shipment of scripture was necessary to activate the presidency. The oath did its constitutional work without a book performing ceremonial support underneath a hand.
The presidency and the Senate have different oath texts, so presidential examples should not be offered as substitutes for the rules governing senators. Their relevance is narrower and clear: the broader assertion that legitimate American public service always requires a Bible cannot survive these documented ceremonies. Tradition has never been as uniform as the outrage suggests.
Congressional history supplies religious variety within the same institution. The Library of Congress reported that Representatives Sander Levin and Brad Sherman used a historic Hebrew Bible for their individual ceremonies in January 2007. Ellison used Jefferson’s Quran, and Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen borrowed a King James Bible (Fineberg, 2007).
These choices expressed different personal connections without assigning different constitutional duties. A member using a Hebrew Bible did not receive one version of congressional responsibility and a member using a Quran another. The ceremonies acknowledged the people taking the oath; the office continued to impose its own obligations.
None of those examples proves that the participants governed wisely. That is a separate inquiry requiring attention to their records. A ceremonial object cannot establish competence, honesty, compassion, or fidelity to constitutional limits, which is precisely why evaluating the object is such a poor substitute for evaluating the official.
A Swearing-In Photograph Is Not the Whole Procedure
Public ceremonies compress complicated institutions into recognizable images. There is a raised hand, an official administering an oath, a family nearby, and frequently a book. The picture looks like a complete explanation, which makes it tempting to assume that every visible detail is legally required.
The Congressional Research Service removes the guesswork for the Senate. Its explanation of opening-day proceedings states that senators may hold a family Bible, another item, or nothing. No Bible or other object is required for taking the oath (Congressional Research Service, 2025).
Nothing is an especially useful option to keep in mind. It means the legal question cannot turn on whether the chosen object has the preferred religious content. An object that is not required cannot plausibly become the hidden source of the oath’s constitutional validity.
The Senate describes an official ceremony in its chamber and a later reenactment in the Old Senate Chamber. The latter gives senators and their families an opportunity to commemorate the occasion in photographs. Its history is connected to restrictions that once limited photography of the official proceedings (U.S. Senate, n.d.-b).
A reenactment is not fraudulent or meaningless. Families can reasonably treasure it, and the public can reasonably recognize its symbolism. The error comes from treating a photograph of that moment as if it were a complete transcript of the institution’s legal process.
The same care applies to the vice president’s role. Federal law assigns administration of the senatorial oath to the president of the Senate, and Senate procedure provides for the president pro tempore to administer it in the vice president’s absence. The system does not make an incoming senator’s legitimacy dependent on one particular politician’s willingness to pose pleasantly beside them (2 U.S.C. § 21; U.S. Senate, n.d.-b).
That is relevant to the viral meme’s jab at Vance. A pointed joke about a potentially uncomfortable ceremony is fair material for political commentary. It should not be inflated into a claim that he personally possesses a religious veto over who can enter the Senate.
Nor does the image establish that Vance has objected to the particular book El-Sayed may select. Its wording presents a conditional insult. Reporting should preserve the difference between an actual statement, a predicted reaction, and somebody’s caption written for maximum satisfaction.
The sharper joke is institutional anyway. Whatever personal irritation may exist, the office requires attention to a public duty. That is a healthier civic arrangement than letting an official replace constitutional procedure with an improvised customer-service policy: “We reserve the right to refuse senators whose prayer habits make us uncomfortable.”
Religious Liberty Cannot Be a Members-Only Benefit
Defending El-Sayed’s ability to use a Quran does not require defending Islam’s every doctrine. It requires accepting that religious liberty applies to people whose beliefs differ from one’s own. A right reserved for agreeable beliefs would offer very little protection and generate an exhausting number of approval meetings.
The distinction protects Christians, too. A government authorized to decide which religion is acceptable would need to make judgments about denominations, teachings, practices, and professions of belief. People currently confident that their faith would pass inspection should spend a moment considering who might conduct the next inspection.
The legal history includes a revealing example unrelated to the Senate. In Torcaso v. Watkins (1961), the Supreme Court rejected Maryland’s requirement that a person declare belief in God to qualify for public office. The case involved an appointment as a notary public, demonstrating that religious exclusion could reach even a position far removed from national political celebrity.
The constitutional reasoning deserves accurate treatment. The Court decided the case on First Amendment religious-freedom grounds and expressly declined to decide whether Article VI’s religious-test prohibition itself applied to state offices. Flattening that distinction would turn a sound argument into an avoidable legal error (Torcaso v. Watkins, 1961).
Voters remain free to judge candidates’ beliefs and scrutinize how those convictions shape policy. The constitutional prohibition on government religious tests does not require citizens to suspend political judgment—it simply demands a consistent standard. If a Christian candidate proposes restricting someone’s rights on religious grounds, examine the proposal and its constitutional implications. If a Muslim candidate makes a comparable proposal, apply the same scrutiny. Neither candidate deserves immunity, and neither candidate’s religious label eliminates the need for evidence.
Consider two hypothetical officials. One holds a Bible for the cameras and later supports denying legal protections to a disfavored community. The other holds a Quran and consistently defends those protections for people who reject Islam. Reverse the religions and the principle remains intact. That is the test of whether someone is defending constitutional government or merely rooting for familiar symbols.
The Book Cannot Do the Official’s Ethics Homework
There is no moral security system concealed inside a ceremonial Bible. A Quran cannot prevent dishonesty by proximity. A volume of constitutional law cannot make an evasive politician suddenly answer the question they were asked.
One of the laziest habits in political commentary is treating visible religiosity as evidence of public virtue. Books can shape conscience and deepen reflection over time, but the momentary placement of a hand provides no substitute for examining conduct. The Senate oath’s own history underscores this point: its modern language emerged from Civil War-era disputes over loyalty and public service, with the current form retained after an 1884 revision (U.S. Senate, n.d.-a). The institution’s historical emphasis centers on obligations and allegiance during national conflict, rather than an approved list of religious accessories.
That background should redirect public attention from ceremonial props to actual governance. Anyone can look solemn for thirty seconds. Sustained accountability requires tracking legislative records, constituent service, factual accuracy, and respect for constitutional limits.
The same standard belongs on every senator’s desk. A Christian senator who misleads the public does not become more credible through ownership of an impressive family Bible. A nonreligious senator who performs the job conscientiously does not become less trustworthy through the absence of one.
Media coverage and voters alike do better when they connect belief to concrete conduct—asking what policy an official proposes, who it affects, and what constitutional authority permits it. Anger about a religious text may produce an easy argument, but it does not inspect a budget, evaluate a nomination, or expose a false claim. A politician who would prefer scrutiny to remain at the level of ceremonial props has every reason to welcome that distraction.
Read the Promise, Then Watch the Person
The most useful response to the meme is neither blind applause nor a fresh outbreak of religious panic, but an accurate account of what has been proposed, what remains undecided, and what the constitutional obligation requires. El-Sayed’s book selection remained open in the November 12 interview, and Jefferson’s Quran has a documented congressional history. Neither fact alters the public duty attaching to a Senate seat.
There is a broader challenge here for anyone claiming constitutional patriotism. Commitment to the founding document has to survive encountering a fellow citizen whose name, religion, or background feels unfamiliar. Otherwise, constitutional devotion becomes a decorative preference—suitable for display, unreliable in practice.
Religious liberty does not become less American when a Muslim exercises it, nor does a Christian’s freedom shrink when a Jewish person, a Hindu, or an atheist takes office without imitating Christian worship. Equal treatment is not a subtraction from the majority’s citizenship.
Civic responsibility requires carrying that distinction past the ceremony, after the family photographs circulate and the internet moves on to its next outrage. If El-Sayed violates his constitutional obligation, criticize him with facts and full force. If another senator violates it with a hand still practically warm from touching a Bible, apply the same judgment. The binding of the book offers neither a defense nor an indictment.
Jefferson’s Quran is an excellent historical rebuttal to a bad claim, not a permission slip that Muslim Americans need to borrow. Their eligibility for public office does not depend on receiving posthumous approval from a famous Virginian.
The oath is to the Constitution of the United States of America. The book can express the person’s conscience, history, or faith; the person must answer for the job. Anyone determined to defend the Constitution should begin by reading the commitment being made—and then spend more time watching whether it is kept.
